苹果淫院

Probing Matamajaw Salmon Club v. Duchaine: Cassels and the Emergence of Comparative Law

Probant Desrosiers v. The King: la sp茅cificit茅 et l鈥檃ssimilation des traditions juridiques en juxtaposition

Probing Matamajaw Salmon Club v. Duchaine: Cassels and the Emergence of Comparative Law

By Mario Michas, 2L, Faculty of Law, 苹果淫院

Professor Rosalie Jukier once told me that Matamajaw Club v. Duchaine gave her anxiety when she studied the case with Professor Madeleine Cantin Cumyn in her first year of law school. With one Superior Court judgment,¹ four judgments from the Quebec Court of Appeal,² five individual judgments from the Supreme Court of Canada³ and a final judgment rendered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,⁴ Matamajaw is a difficult case to study. Given the complexity of the legal issues at stake, I will not discuss Matamajaw鈥檚 legal implications. Instead, I will focus on the case鈥檚 comparative law value. I will be assessing the methodology the members of the Supreme Court of Canada used to arrive at their respective decisions. I will highlight how Justice Cassels adopted a unique approach that promotes a healthy exchange between the civil and common law on Canada鈥檚 highest court.

Matamajaw v Duchaine arises from a complicated set of facts that occurred over several decades. It involves property transactions between multiple parties. The essence of the case is about fishing rights and their nature as well as characterization within the framework of property law. This is a case from Quebec. The facts are the following. Joseph Pinault sold to Robert Alexandre Blais a piece of land in Rimouski in 1889. There was a lake adjacent to the land and the parties agreed that the property title included ownership up to the middle of the stream. In 1890, Blais exchanged the fishing rights for another land owned by a certain Lord Mount Stephen and the notary registered the deed of exchange. There seemed to be a dispute as to the duration of Stephen鈥檚 rights to fish in the lake: whether the rights lasted as long as Stephen was alive or whether they might be passed on to his heirs. Stephen then sold the fishing rights to the Restigouche Salmon Club in 1892. In 1905, the Restigouche Salmon Club sold it to the Matamajaw Salmon Club but the registering deed omitted the clause specifying where the fishing rights were attached. Blais became insolvent and his estate鈥檚 curators sold the land in question to his widow. In 1914, Blais鈥� widow sold it to Duchaine. Duchaine disputed the Club鈥檚 fishing rights and argued that only he had the right to fish there.⁵

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The Superior Court held that the fishing rights given to Stephen amounted to real rights and rights of ownership and held that the Club had the right to fish.⁶ The Court of appeal confirmed⁷ the trial judgment. Duchaine appealed it to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that Lord Mount Stephen had acquired a lifetime right of enjoyment and allowed Duchaine鈥檚 appeal, setting aside the lower courts鈥� judgments. Justices Idington and Cassels dissented.⁸ The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reversed the Supreme Court of Canada and restored the trial judgment. Writing for the Committee, Lord Haldane held that Matamajaw Club acquired a real right in the form of a perpetual right of fishing in the river that was separate from the right of ownership over the bed of the river.⁹

The majority in the Supreme Court of Canada was composed of Justice Francis Alexander Anglin, later Chief Justice of Canada as well as Justices Louis Philippe Brodeur and Pierre-Basile Mignault. The dissenting minority was formed by Justices John Idington and Walter Cassels. Each justice issued his own reasons.¹⁰

Justice Anglin鈥檚 reasons are typical of his usual approach. He gave detailed and thorough reasons. Despite being trained in the common law, he refers to a plethora of civilian authorities ranging from Baudry-Lacantinerie and Planiol to Demolombe. He also cites several articles of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. In addition, Anglin J. deliberately discusses the history of fishing rights both at common law and civil law and explains that at common law, the concept of profit 脿 prendre is a Norman concept.¹¹ He also refers to judgments issued by Quebec courts. In essence, his reasons are reliant on civilian authorities. He does not discuss common law concepts at length, but does discuss them sufficiently.¹² On the reliance of his colleagues on the common law, Anglin J. remarks, 鈥�(...) English cases cannot properly be invoked as authorities until it is first established that the principles of the English law bearing upon the subject under consideration are the same as those of the civil law of Quebec. That may not be assumed鈥�.¹³ This remark illustrates the justice鈥檚 concern with 鈥渋mporting鈥� common law principles into the civil law.

As for Justice Brodeur, a civilian jurist, he refers more to civilian authorities than any of the other justices. He makes abundant reference to the most 鈥渁ugust鈥� civilian authorities such as Demolombe, Aubry & Rau and other classic authors. He also cites articles of the C.C.L.-C. as well as Quebec cases.¹⁴ He is therefore relying on doctrine, case law as well as legislation to arrive at his decision. He also tries to distinguish the common law principles from those of the civil law by holding that the common law principle of profit 脿 prendre does not exist in civil law.¹⁵ He gives a similar warning that his colleague Anglin J. gave, 鈥�(...)il est toujours dangereux de recourir 脿 une l茅gislation 茅trang猫re pour d茅terminer les principes de notre propre l茅gislation鈥�.¹⁶

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Mr. Justice Mignault gave the longest reasons. As one of the leading authors in Quebec civil law, he refers to all the classic civilian authors, Quebec cases and the articles of the Civil Code.¹⁷ He adopts the same approach as his colleagues Brodeur and Anglin JJ. Mignault takes issue with the common law terminology, the profit 脿 prendre. He adds to Brodeur and Anglin鈥檚 voices by observing that in his view the concept of profit 脿 prendre does not exist in the civil law. Mignault J. states, 鈥�(...) the use of such a term (...) is confusing even though it may be thought that there is a certain analogy between one right and another鈥�.¹⁸

Justice Idington, staying true to his characteristic brevity, issued straightforward and succinct reasons. He mentions an article of the Civil Code of Lower Canada and prefers to focus on the facts of the case to arrive at a decision. He does not refer to any other authorities whether from the civil law or the common law. He mentions, 鈥淚 am unable to find any such prohibition in this country or in the law of Quebec in relation to an owner dealing in any way he sees fit with the proprietorship of the whole or part of a private stream non-navigable and non-floatable as the one in question is鈥�.¹⁹ This passage illustrates that Idington, trained only in the common law, considers the 鈥渓aw of this country鈥�, meaning Canadian Common Law as instructive as is 鈥渢he law of Quebec鈥�. This attitude is characteristic of Idington鈥檚 approach, an approach that tended to assimilate the two legal traditions 鈥渨illy-nilly鈥�. By assimilation, I mean a tendency to ignore the differences of the two legal traditions and a desire to treat them as indistinguishable traditions. Such an attitude was tied to a belief that the common law was superior to the civil law, as Idington demonstrated in other cases.²⁰

Finally, Mr. Justice Cassels, a common law judge born and raised in Quebec, but from Ontario, issued the most interesting reasons for the purposes of comparative law. Cassels was not a Supreme Court of Canada Justice. He was a member of the Exchequer Court, the ancestor of the Federal Court who sat exceptionally on this case as an ad hoc member.²¹ His reasons explicitly and openly try to argue in favor of the legitimacy of comparative law. He specifically endorses looking beyond one鈥檚 legal system and tradition for inspiration. He makes deliberate reference to American case law, Canadian Common Law cases, as well as English cases.²² Cassels also refers to the jurisprudence of the old Seigneral court,²³ that is the full extent of his mentions of civilian authorities. The essence of the justice鈥檚 comparative law comments lies in the following passage:

I find no difference between the law of the Province of Quebec and the law of England in this respect. I am quite in accord with the view of my brother judges that when a question has to be decided arising in the Province of Quebec and governed by the laws of the Province of Quebec such a case should be decided by the laws of that province; but I fail to see why the decisions of the courts of England or of the United States should not be referred to as guides to arriving at the correct interpretation of such laws.²⁴

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This comment is a clear approval of comparative law. It is the precursor to Professor Patrick Glenn鈥檚 notion of persuasive authority.²⁵ The 鈥渋nterpretative guides鈥� Cassels speaks of are particularly analogous to the idea of persuasive authority because what guides you does not necessarily bind you, it simply assists you on your path to arriving at a solution. Thus, for Cassels J., looking to another legal tradition or system provides assistance in arriving at a conclusion. Cassels J. provides one with a respite from the absolutism of figures such as Mignault and Idington and instead offers us a workable middle ground. This middle ground allows us to respect the specificity and particularities of the legal tradition or system one is bound to apply but, simultaneously, enables us to remove the metaphorical blinkers from our heads and look elsewhere for inspiration. This approach favors mutual and respectful interactions between the common and civil law. Interactions that enable the civilians and common lawyers to learn from one another and inspire each other.

Where Mignault and Idington are championing absolute isolation on the one hand and absolute assimilation and uniformisation on the other, Cassels J. proposes something different. He focuses on the sources and on the authorities. Comparative law is very much about the materials and sources of the respective legal systems and traditions. These can be doctrine, legislation, case law, or can even take other forms. Comparative law is about how one refers to these and uses them. Cassels J. was aware of this and therefore chose to discuss the importance one should attach to these sources. In a Quebec case, Cassels recognises that one is 鈥済overned鈥� by Quebec law. However, being 鈥済overned鈥� by Quebec law does not prohibit looking to other legal systems and traditions to assist in illuminating the rules of the civil law. The word 鈥渁ssist鈥� is key because one should not feel bound by using foreign law to interpret domestic law, but听rather should see it, to use Cassels J.鈥檚 words, as 鈥渋nterpretive guides鈥�. As the French say, 鈥淐鈥檈st en se comparant qu鈥檕n se comprend鈥�.

Probant Desrosiers v. The King: la sp茅cificit茅 et l鈥檃ssimilation des traditions juridiques en juxtaposition

Par Mario Michas, 2L, Faculty of Law, 苹果淫院

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尝鈥檃蹿蹿补颈谤别 Desrosiers v. The King¹ est souvent cit茅e comme l鈥檈xemple le plus d茅taill茅 de la pens茅e juridique quant aux interactions entre le droit civil et la common law du juge Pierre- Basile Mignault². C鈥檈st une des affaires les plus importantes du point de vue du droit compar茅. Desrosiers est le r茅ceptacle d鈥檜n dialogue entre les juges de la Cour supr锚me quant 脿 leurs visions sur la place que doit occuper le droit compar茅 脿 cette institution. Par dialogue j鈥檈ntend un 茅change, une forme de communication, sur le droit compar茅 entre les juges 脿 travers leurs jugements. Je propose d鈥檈xplorer la valeur de Desrosiers sous le regard du droit compar茅. Pour y arriver, je propose un survol des faits de l鈥檃ffaire, des arr锚ts des tribunaux inf茅rieurs et des questions juridiques. L鈥檈mphase sera mise sur l鈥檃pproche et la m茅thodologie de chaque juge et non sur l鈥檃rticulation et l鈥檃pplication du droit.

Desrosiers v. The King est une affaire que la Cour supr锚me a d茅cid茅 en 1920. 尝鈥檃蹿蹿补颈谤别 茅mane d鈥檜n litige prolong茅 entre Hospice Desrosiers, un producteur de foin et James McDonnell, agent de la Couronne. Hospice Desrosiers avait vendu du foin 脿 McDonnell pendant la premi猫re guerre mondiale. McDonnell n鈥檃vait pas mentionn茅 qu鈥檌l achetait le foin pour le gouvernement. Il y a eu un d茅faut de paiement et Desrosiers a poursuivi McDonnell en responsabilit茅 contractuelle. Desrosiers a obtenu jugement contre McDonnell. Durant son t茅moignage, McDonnell a mentionn茅 qu鈥檌l avait achet茅 le foin pour la couronne³. Desrosiers a eu l鈥檌d茅e de poursuivre la couronne en tant que mandant du mandataire McDonnell sous les articles 1716, 1717 et 1727 du Code civil du Bas-Canada.

La Cour de l'茅chiquier, l鈥檃nc锚tre de la Cour f茅d茅rale, a refus茅 de tenir la couronne responsable en se basant sur la doctrine de l鈥櫭┍舯鸪Τ倬贝遣�, une doctrine de common law, qui veut que lorsqu鈥檕n obtient jugement contre le commettant ou le pr茅pos茅 ou encore m锚me contre le mandant ou le mandataire, on ne peut pas poursuivre l鈥檃utre⁴. Desrosiers en a fait appel de cette d茅cision 脿 la Cour supr锚me. La question juridique cl茅 dans cette affaire est 脿 savoir si Desrosiers peut poursuivre la couronne apr猫s avoir obtenu jugement contre McDonnell en droit civil.

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Le banc de la Cour supr锚me compos茅 des juges Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeur et Mignault, le juge Idington 茅tant dissident, a tranch茅 en faveur de Desrosiers. La Cour a d茅cid茅 que le droit civil n鈥檃dmet pas la doctrine d鈥櫭┍舯鸪Τ倬贝遣� et qu鈥檜ne personne peut poursuivre soit le commettant ou le pr茅pos茅 apr猫s avoir obtenu un jugement contre l鈥檜n d鈥檈ntre eux⁵. Chaque juge, sauf le juge Duff qui a simplement 茅t茅 en faveur d'accueillir l鈥檃ppel, a 茅crit son propre jugement. Le r茅sultat auquel les juges arrivent n鈥檈st gu猫re surprenant si on 茅tudie leur m茅thodologie de plus pr猫s.

Les juges Brodeur, Anglin et Mignault ont adopt茅 une approche similaire. Ils ont tous d茅cid茅 l鈥檃ffaire en se basant sur les autorit茅s du droit civil. Le juge Idington, quant 脿 lui, a donn茅 un jugement tr猫s court dans lequel il propose d鈥檜niformiser le droit civil et la common law sur la question des recours contre les pr茅pos茅s et commettants afin de faciliter les 茅changes commerciaux⁶.

Malgr茅 son 茅ducation et experience de common lawyer, le juge Anglin r茅f猫re abondamment 脿 la doctrine fran莽aise et qu茅b茅coise. Il traite aussi en grand d茅tail les autorit茅s de common law tel Story et la jurisprudence de la Chambre des Lords. Il base son jugement en particulier sur l鈥檕uvrage du juge Langelier⁷. Le juge Anglin 茅carte l鈥檃pplication de la doctrine de l'茅濒别肠迟颈辞苍 et 茅tablit la r猫gle de droit civil que la victime garde son recours contre le pr茅pos茅 ou le commettant, le cas 茅ch茅ant, m锚me si elle a obtenu jugement contre l鈥檜n d鈥檈ntre eux⁸.

Le juge Brodeur, un civiliste qu茅b茅cois, nous offre un jugement plus court avec moins de r茅f茅rences. Il fait r茅f茅rence uniquement au droit civil et en particulier au droit civil fran莽ais. Il cite le rapport des codificateurs, Troplong et Pothier. Il r茅it猫re la r猫gle de droit civil que la victime maintient son recours contre le pr茅pos茅 si elle a obtenu jugement contre le commettant et vice-versa⁹.

Mignault, le civiliste connu, quant 脿 lui, discute de la d茅cision du juge Audette de la Cour de l鈥櫭ヽhiquier 脿 fond. Il s鈥檕ppose 脿 l鈥檌d茅e que puisque le rapport des codificateurs mentionne qu鈥檜ne r猫gle contenue dans le Code, tir茅e de Pothier, est similaire aux r猫gles contenues en droit anglais on peut recourir au droit anglais pour interpr茅ter la r猫gle. Le juge Mignault mentionne que ce n鈥檈st pas parce qu鈥檜ne r猫gle de droit civil est d鈥檃ccord avec une r猫gle de droit anglais qu鈥檕n peut utiliser la r猫gle de droit anglais¹⁰. Mignault 茅tudie les autorit茅s de common law qui lui ont 茅t茅 cit茅es et trouve que les articles 1716 et 1717 C.c.B.C. ne peuvent pas accueillir la doctrine de l鈥�茅濒别肠迟颈辞苍¹¹. Cette r茅f茅rence 脿 la common law n鈥檈st pas, bien s没r, un exemple de droit compar茅, car ce n鈥檈st pas une r茅f茅rence d茅lib茅r茅e dans l鈥檕ptique de s鈥檌nspirer d鈥檜ne autre tradition. C鈥檈st juste un effort de disposer des autorit茅s et sources que les avocats ont cit茅. Il base sa d茅cision, comme son coll猫gue le juge Anglin, en grande partie sur un passage du Cours de droit civil du juge Sir Fran莽ois Langelier¹².

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Le juge Idington, un juge de common law, dans une d茅cision fort typique de son style, dit qu鈥檌l n鈥檡 a pas de 芦 settled jurisprudence in Quebec 禄 sur la question¹³. Avec ce commentaire il justifie son recours 脿 la common law et, pour utiliser un terme de droit compar茅, 芦 transplante 禄 la doctrine de l鈥櫭┍舯鸪Τ倬贝遣� en droit civil¹⁴. Le juge Idington semble se baser sur des raisons de politique publique en expliquant qu鈥檌l serait absurde de reconna卯tre la possibilit茅 d'exercer plusieurs recours¹⁵. Il mentionne 茅galement qu鈥檌l faut uniformiser l鈥檃pproche de la common law et du droit civil afin d鈥檃dopter une r猫gle du droit anglais qui a 芦 that practical business sense which always tends to minimize the operation of the purely litigious spirit 禄¹⁶.

脌 l鈥檃ide du survol de la m茅thodologie et des approches des juges, il est 茅vident qu鈥檌l y a deux philosophies quant au droit compar茅 dans cette affaire. Une philosophie pr茅conise la sauvegarde du droit civil et souligne sa sp茅cificit茅. C鈥檈st la pens茅e des juges Mignault, Anglin et Brodeur. L鈥檃utre philosophie, partag茅e par le juge Idington, pr茅conise l鈥檜niformit茅 et le m茅tissage juridique. En d鈥檃utres mots, l鈥檃pproche du juge Idington est en faveur de m茅langer les r猫gles de droit anglais avec le droit civil. Le juge Mignault, longtemps connu comme le repr茅sentant du mouvement pour la sp茅cificit茅 du droit civil,¹⁷ repr茅sente ce camp dans cette affaire. Le juge Idington, repr茅sente le juge de common law typique¹⁸ qui propose de m茅langer les deux traditions juridiques ensemble.

Desrosiers constitue la sc猫ne sur laquelle les acteurs du droit civil et ceux de la common law jouent la pi猫ce de th茅芒tre qui est le droit compar茅. Cette affaire illustre la tension entre les deux philosophies. Il y a un dialogue entre les juges Mignault, Brodeur et Anglin d鈥檜n c么t茅 et le juge Idington de l鈥檃utre. C鈥檈st un dialogue particulier, car c鈥檈st les pens茅es de chaque juge qui entrent en communication entre eux 脿 travers les jugements de leurs ma卯tres. C鈥檈st alors un dialogue entre les pens茅es des juges, plut么t qu鈥檈ntre les juges eux-m锚mes. Mignault et les autres juges r茅agissent aux commentaires d鈥橧dington. Dans cette affaire, le juge Mignault a donn茅 la version la plus compl猫te de sa th茅orie concernant la d茅fense du droit civil¹⁹. Il 茅crit:

Il me semble respectueusement qu'il est temps de r茅agir contre l'habitude de recourir, dans les causes de la province de Qu茅bec, aux pr茅c茅dents du droit commun anglais, pour le motif que le code civil contiendrait une r猫gle qui serait d'accord avec un principe du droit anglais. Sur bien des points, et surtout en mati猫re de mandat, le code civil et le common law contiennent des r猫gles semblables. Cependant le droit civil constitue un syst猫me complet par lui-m锚me et doit s'interpr茅ter d'apr猫s ses propres r猫gles. Si pour cause d'identit茅 de principes juridiques on peut recourir au droit anglais pour interpr茅ter le droit civil fran莽ais, on pourrait avec autant de raison citer les monuments de la jurisprudence fran莽aise pour mettre en lumi猫re les r猫gles du droit anglais²⁰.

Pareillement, Idington a r茅v茅l茅 toute sa pens茅e quand il a pr锚ch茅 la sup茅riorit茅 de la common law concernant le droit des affaires et l鈥檌mportance de la suivre. Le passage suivant illustre son orientation: (...)instead of adopting, for the first time, a novel rule to be peculiar to Quebec we should, so far as we can, when applying relevant law which in its substance is identical with that of the other provinces wherein the law is founded on and is English law, aim at a degree of uniformity in its administration instead of deciding in a way that will tend to produce confusion and unjustifiable expense²¹.

Comme l鈥檃ffaire Desrosiers contient les versions des pens茅es des repr茅sentants de chaque philosophie les plus compl猫tes, elle est essentielle pour comprendre le fonctionnement du droit compar茅 au d茅but du 20i猫me si猫cle de la Cour supr锚me. C鈥檈st une affaire qui repr茅sente tr猫s bien l鈥檃pproche que Mignault et d鈥檃utres comme lui ont adopt茅e dans d鈥檃utres affaires et m锚me son de cloche chez Idington.

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Les dialogues dans cette affaire sont plus int茅ressants que l鈥檌mpact qu鈥檌ls ont eu. Desrosiers offre l鈥檕pportunit茅 au juge Mignault de lutter contre son pire ennemi: l鈥檃ssimilation du droit civil 脿 la common law. La position d鈥橧dington le transforme en la personnification de cet ennemi. Alors, le juge Mignault est face 脿 l鈥檕bstacle qu鈥檌l doit surpasser pour pouvoir r茅ussir son coup: d茅fendre la sp茅cificit茅 du droit civil. Mais, pour Idington, Mignault est l鈥檕bstacle au 芦 degree of uniformity 禄 qu'il pr茅conise. Idington est l鈥檃ntagoniste dans la lutte o霉 Mignault est le protagoniste. Mais le contraire est vrai aussi: Mignault est l鈥檃ntagoniste d鈥橧dington. Desrosiers juxtapose les d茅sirs de deux repr茅sentants de philosophies diff茅rentes. Deux philosophies qui, si port茅es 脿 l鈥檈xtr锚me, ne peuvent pas se r茅concilier. Alors, il y a une lutte 脿 deux sens. Il y a la lutte de Mignault mais il y a celle d鈥橧dington.

Footnotes听Matamajaw Salmon Club v. Duchaine: Cassels and the Emergence of Comparative Law

1. Matamajaw Salmon Club Ltd c Duchaine, (1 march 1917), Rimouski 5466 (Qc Sup Ct) (Mr. Justice Roy issued the judgment. It is an unreported judgment.) [Matamajaw SC].
2. Duchaine c Matamajaw Salmon Club Ltd, (1917), [1918] 27 BR 196, [1917] JQ no 9 (Qc CA) [Duchaine CA] (Chief Justice Sir Horace Archambault, Mr. Justice Lavergne, Mr. Justice Cross and Mr. Justice Pelletier issued individual judgments).
3. Duchaine v Matamajaw Salmon Club, [1919] 58 SCR 223 1919 CanLII 86 [Duchaine SCC] (Justices Idington, Anglin, Brodeur, Mignault and Cassels (ad hoc) all issued individual judgments).
4. Matamajaw Club v Duchaine, [1921] UKPC 94 [Matamajaw UKPC] (Viscount Haldane, later the Lord Chancellor, wrote the judgment on behalf of the board).
5. See Duchaine SCC, supra note 3 at 241鈥�253 (Mignault J.鈥檚 judgment states the facts clearly).
6. Matamajaw SC, supra note 1 at 2鈥�3.
7. Duchaine CA, supra note 2 at 196鈥�197.
8. Duchaine SCC, supra note 3 at 222.
9. Matamajaw UKPC, supra note 4 at 7.
10. Duchaine SCC, supra note 3 at 222.
11. Ibid at 227鈥�228, Anglin J.
12. Ibid at 227鈥�230.
13. Ibid at 227.
14. Ibid at 231鈥�241, Brodeur J.
15. Ibid at 235.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid at 241鈥�253, Mignault J.
18. Ibid at 246鈥�247.
19. Ibid at 224, Idington J., dissenting.
20. See e.g. Desrosiers v The King, [1920] 60 SCR at 106, 55 DLR 120, Idington J.
21. See Ian Bushnell, The Federal Court of Canada: A History, 1875-1992 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
22. Duchaine SCC, supra note 3 at 253鈥�258, Cassels J. (ad hoc), dissenting. 23 Ibid at 254鈥�255.

24. Ibid at 255.
25. See e.g. HP Glenn, 鈥淧ersuasive Authority鈥� (1987) 32:2 苹果淫院 LJ 261.

Footnotes听Desrosiers v. The King: la sp茅cificit茅 et l鈥檃ssimilation des traditions juridiques en juxtaposition

1. Desrosiers v The King, [1920] 60 RCS, 55 DLR 120.
2. Voir JG Castel, 鈥淟e juge Mignault d茅fenseur de l鈥檌nt茅grit茅 du droit civil qu茅b茅cois鈥� (1975) 53:3 R du B Can 544 脿 la p 547.
3. Voir听Desrosiers,听supra听note 1 脿 la p 127, juge Mignault (Le jugement du juge Mignault refl猫te les faits de l鈥檃ffaire le mieux).
4. Desrosiers v The King, [1919] 18 RC de l鈥櫭� 461 aux pp 466鈥�469, 1919 CanLII 875 (Can CEch), juge Audette (Le juge Audette fait un exercice de droit compar茅 fort int茅ressant. Il cite des sources civilistes, mais trouve que ces sources sont bas茅es sur des sources de听common law听anglaise alors il justifie son ressort 脿 la听common law).听
5. Voir听Desrosiers,听supra听note 1 脿 la p 105.
6. Desrosiers,听supra听note 1 aux pp 106鈥�107.
7. Voir par ex Fran莽ois Langelier,听Cours de droit civil de la Province de Qu茅bec, Montr茅al, Wilson et Lafleur, 1905.
8. Desrosiers,听supra听note 1 脿 la p 117, juge Anglin.
9. Ibid听脿 la p 125, juge Brodeur.
10. Ibid听脿 la p 126, juge Mignault.
11. Ibid听aux pp 128鈥�129 (Le juge Mignault dit, 芦 Il en est autrement dans le droit anglais, et l脿 on d茅cide que celui qui a trait茅 avec un mandataire contractant en son propre nom sans d茅voiler le nom de son mandant, peut poursuivre l鈥檜n ou l'autre, mais non pas les deux, et que s'il prend un jugement contre le mandataire, il ne peut ensuite exercer un recours contre le mandant:听Priestly听v.听Fernie.听C'est sur l'autorit茅 de cette d茅cision que l'honorable juge Audette a renvoy茅 la p茅tition de droit de l'appelant. Le raisonnement de Lord Bramwell dans cette cause et de Lord Cairns dans听Kendall听v.听Hamilton,听est certainement tr猫s fort, et j'aurais 茅t茅 dispos茅 脿 l'accepter comme raison 茅crite si apr猫s m没re r茅flection, je n'茅tais arriv茅 脿 la conclusion que le texte m锚me des articles 1716 et 1727 C.C., interpr茅t茅 脿 la lumi猫re des passages de Pothier et de Story que j'ai cit茅s, ne permet pas d'accueillir la solution que le droit anglais adopte 禄 aux pp 128鈥�129) .
12. Ibid听aux pp 129鈥�130.
13. Ibid听脿 la p 106, juge Idington.
14. Ibid听aux pp 106鈥�107.
15. Ibid听(Le juge Idington 茅crit, 鈥淎re we entitled to so decide in such a way the legal novelty submitted, that hereafter it may be said this court has laid down as law, that no matter how numerous the principals or chain of agents concerned in bringing about a contract, a litigious third party may select one after another of such agents and principals and sue to judgment unless and until one or other of numerous judgments so recovered has been satisfied, and that with costs? I submit we should not run any such risks but accept that jurisprudence, even if not absolutely binding, which manifestly in principle violates nothing in law or justice鈥� 脿 la p 107).
16. Ibid听脿 la p 106.
17. Voir par ex Castel,听supra听note 2. Voir Louis LeBel et Pierre Le Saunier, 芦 L鈥檌nteraction du droit civil et de la common law 脿 la Cour supr锚me du Canada 禄 (2006) 47:2 C de D 179 脿 la p 186鈥�189
18. Je fais r茅f茅rence ici au ph茅nom猫ne pr茅sent 脿 la Cour supr锚me selon lequel les juges de听common law听faisaient, pour la plupart, recours 脿 la听common law听pour d茅cider les affaires de droit civil. Pour une description de ceci voir Andrew Stobo Sniderman et Mariella Montplaisir-Bazan, 芦 La Cour supr锚me du Canada, le听Code civil du Qu茅bec听et le r么le des juges de common law: une 茅tude des arr锚ts de 1976-2019 禄 (2022) 100:3 R du B Can 548 aux pp 554鈥�556. Voir Jean-Louis Baudouin, 芦 L鈥檌nterpr茅tation du Code civil qu茅b茅cois par la Cour supr锚me du Canada 禄 (1975) 53:4 R du B Can 715.
19. Voir Castel,听supra听note 2 脿 la p 547.
20. Desrosiers,听supra听note 1 脿 la p 126
21. Ibid听aux pp 106鈥�107.